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Abstract: Drawing on contributions from heterodox international political economy, this 
paper uses the notions of structural power and modes of governance to analyze the 
conditions that help explain emerging trends in the reform of extractive governance. 
Based on case studies of governance reform dynamics in Guinea and Mongolia, the 
article argues that, in certain cases, the possibility of change exists in the modes of 
governance and that with these changes, the shifting of relations of power among the 
actors concerned can begin.  
The paper is divided into four main sections. After a brief outline of its theoretical 
framing, the next section explores the legacy of the far-reaching liberalization reforms 
that have been introduced into the mining sectors in mineral-rich countries across the 
Global South. The following two sections examine the contestation of this legacy at 
various levels and in various arenas, based on two case studies, Guinea and Mongolia. 
The paper’s final section contrasts these experiences of contestation and reflects on the 
meaning of these changes in terms of contestation, political settlements, modes of 
governance, and the beginning of the shift in relations of power among the actors 
concerned.*  
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1. Introduction  
This paper makes the case for the use of the concepts of structural power and modes of 
governance to understand the conditions that help explain emerging trends relating to the 
reform of extractive governance. Drawing on contributions from heterodox international 
political economy, the paper argues that in certain cases it is possible to see changes in a 
country’s modes of governance and, with these changes, the beginning of a shifting in 
relations of power among the actors concerned.  
 
The arguments guiding this paper are illustrated via two case studies: Guinea and 
Mongolia. Both countries are rich in natural resources, where neoliberal restructuring of 
the mining sector successfully attracted massive investment. However, these reforms 
have also caused significant social and environmental costs yet have done little to 
improve living conditions. The resource booms led to pressure from civil society for a 
new wave of reform and measures that would bring more equitable returns, contribute to 
local development, and be more respectful of the environment. In turn, these 
developmental reforms were met with counter-reform pressures designed to dilute or 
neutralize civil society efforts. The counter-reform measures have been, in part, 
successful in Guinea and more so in Mongolia.  
 
Situations vary significantly over time, from country to country. and from site to site, 
However, the two cases analyzed in this paper help illustrate the fact that, in certain 
contexts, there is evidence to suggest that new dynamics are at play, whether resulting 
from regulatory changes, social pressures, or a combination of the two. These 
experiences show that in certain cases and under specific circumstances (which deserve 
examination), contestation is taking place within a continuum of interconnected arenas 
and has entailed the beginning of a redefinition of relations of power and influence 
among actors. 
 
The paper is divided into four main sections. After a brief outline of its theoretical 
framing and the legacy of far-reaching liberalizing reforms in the first section, the next 





Mongolia. The final section of the paper briefly contrasts these experiences and reflects 
on the usefulness of the concepts of modes of governance and structural power, the 
beginning of shifts in relations of power among the actors concerned. 
 
2. Context and theoretical framing 
Under the auspices of international financial institutions (IFIs) in the 1980s and 1990s, an 
overwhelming majority of governments in resource-rich countries across the Global 
South introduced liberalized mining regimes, ostensibly to spur development in their 
mineral-rich but indebted countries. The IFIs recommended the introduction of 
successive generations of far-reaching liberalization measures aimed at specifically 
attracting foreign direct investments in an increasingly privatized large-scale mining 
sector. This occurred in conjunction with reforms calling for the strong retrenchment of 
the state from the mining sector. Over time, the IFIs encouraged countries to align their 
mining legislation with the most liberalized mining codes. This led to a cumulative 
process of liberalization that aimed to create an environment that was as attractive as 
possible to private investment (Campbell, 2004, 2009b; Hatcher, 2014; World Bank, 
1992). In other words, the measures promoted by IFIs created regional and continental 
dynamics whereby individual countries were encouraged to compete in creating the most 
liberalized mining regime. 
 
While these reforms have been quite successful in attracting foreign direct investment, 
they have also radically shifted power and authority from state to private actors, thereby 
redefining relations between elites and communities. These shifts have contributed to a 
reduced institutional capacity to enforce regulations and, consequently, the norms 
essential for developing and protecting the environment have also weakened. In many 
cases, the institutionalization of particular modes of reproduction of power relations has 
also occurred. Similar to the experience of petroleum-rich countries, notably Nigeria, 
where Obi (2001; 2004) has identified and analyzed a “politics of oil,” the “politics of 
mining” that has emerged and been perpetuated in the Global South is often severely 





introduction and overview of mining sector reforms and the norms that underpin them. At 
the center of these norms are the following1 (Gagné-Ouellet, 2013: 52): 
• Priority given to the private sector for mining activities; 
• Priority given to mining over other types of land use;  
• Priority given to an exportable resource (i.e., gold) over other mineral resources; 
• Priority given to the industrial mining sector over artisanal and small-scale mines; 
• Guarantees protecting industrial-sector mining rights; and 
• Calculation of the mining sector’s primary contribution to the national economy 
in terms of tax revenues. 
Across the Global South, the legacy of these neoliberal reforms has raised wide-ranging 
and important concerns about the severe economic and socio-environmental impacts of 
the expansion of the mining frontier.2 In recent years, the legacy of the reforms and the 
norms embedded in the resulting regulatory frameworks have increasingly been contested 
by countless entities at multiple levels (local (via community struggles), national, and 
regional) and in many arenas.  
 
Consequently, scholars have been attempting to understand why, despite such an outcry, 
changes in neoliberal norms have seldom materialized across the Global South. 
Significant attention has been focused on Latin America, where several governments 
have embraced “neo-extractivist” modes of mining exploitation, whereby the continued 
support for extractive industries by governments is wrapped into a discourse of social 
justice and poverty reduction (Acosta, 2013; Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington, 2012; 
Arrellano Yaguas, 2011; Gudynas, 2010). However, certain analysts, including Gudynas 
(2010) and Acosta (2013), have suggested that the central characteristics of the model 
have remained unchanged under neo-extractivism, including the enclave nature of the 
sector, its orientation to foreign market demand, the lack of domestic processing, and 
large environmental and social costs (Szablowski and Zalik, 2014: 2). 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing and rich discussion around the possibility of 





natural resources. Drawing on contributions from heterodox international political 
economy, the paper makes the case for using the notion of structural relations of power to 
examine the conditions that point toward the possibility of change in the modes of 
governance of a given country and, with them, the beginning of a shifting of relations of 
power among actors concerned. The term “structural relations of power” refers to the 
ability to create essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of 
a particular system, whether national or international.  
 
The analysis of power and the distinction between relational and structural power, in 
particular, was at the center of most of Susan Strange’s later writings about the global 
political economy (1994; 1996; Stopford, Strange, and Henley, 1991). She believed that 
structural power is more important than relational power in the contemporary world, 
describing it as: 
the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy 
within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises, and 
(not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate; structural 
power, in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to 
shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate 
to corporate enterprises. (1994: 24–25) 
In using the notion of structural power as proposed by Susan Strange, we recognize that 
this concept has been the subject of a considerable amount of debate.3 For example, as 
noted by Palan, Strange’s concept of structural power is not so much a theory as it is a 
heuristic tool (Palan, 1999: 128). Indeed, Strange has been criticized for her lack of 
engagement with various power theorists (Palan, 1999: 128), a criticism that leads Cohen 
to suggest that her understanding of power was incomplete (Cohen, 2016: 114). 
However, her aim was not “to develop a full theory of IPE [international political 
economy], but a way of thinking, a framework for thinking” (Tooze and May, 2002: 15, 
cited in Cohen, 2016: 112). With these critiques in mind, we believe that Strange’s 
identification of power is particularly useful when applied to the extractive sector “as a 





2016: 114). In this regard, regulatory frameworks in the mining sector can be understood 
as the expression of structural power relations and, at the same time, a key instrument 
contributing to the reproduction of such power relations that link powerful external actors 
(corporate, financial, diplomatic) to powerful internal ones, or that influence the relations 
of local communities affected by mining activities to powerful internal actors. Research 
carried out by the Groupe de recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique also allows 
us to analyze mining regimes not only as a regulatory framework but, above all, as a key 
part of the power structure that conditions relations among actors within the sector.4 
 
This analysis further relies on the concept of modes of governance in the mining sector. 
This concept refers to the sum of the forms of regulation for each of the related 
dimensions (economic, social, political and environmental) that determine, in any given 
period or place, the conditions of exploitation of mining resources (Belem, 2009a, 
Campbell, 2013). These forms are multi-scalar and include both national and 
transnational forms of regulation. The concept is intended to help analysts focus on the 
specific social relations at the root of institutional arrangements, as well as the role of 
actors involved in the decision-making processes that emanate from these arrangements. 
It also highlights the need to take account of how forms of regulation interact as well to 
institutional arrangements, relations of power, and influence. 
 
Structural relations of power and modes of governance also help highlight the existence 
of shifts in practice and, as a consequence, the possible formation of new political spaces. 
In other words, these shifts, which take place in specific circumstances, have entailed 
new political settlements involving political elites and other constituencies and that, 
consequently, suggest the possibility of changes in the modes of governance and, with 
these changes, the beginning of the shifting of relations of power among the actors 
concerned. As the paper illustrates, it is important to make the distinction between these 
two concepts and the manner in which they interact.  
 
Building on elements of heterodox international political economy, this paper adopts a 





which, under specific circumstances, political processes may cause shifts in structural 
power. While a case for the comparative analysis of a large pool of countries can easily 
be argued, we believe that there is merit in studying just two cases as a way to exemplify 
the processes resulting in shifts of structural power, processes that we believe need to be 
nuanced and as such, can be better illustrated by in-depth analysis. Guinea and Mongolia 
are relevant examples, as they are two of the world’s most richly endowed countries in 
natural resources and are geographically suitable countries through which— albeit 
cautiously—we can point toward broader regional trends that may help to explain the 
context in which shifts in structural power have taken place. However, it is also important 
to note that the study of these two countries is in no way representative of the diversity of 
experiences elsewhere in these regions. This analysis attempts to synthesize data 
collected from the rich array of available desk studies and the authors’ previous work in 
both regions, including, in the case of Mongolia, extensive field research.5  
 
3. Reform and counter-reform in Guinea (1984–2013) 
Guinea is among the most richly endowed countries in the African continent, possessing 
the world’s largest reserves of high-grade bauxite, more than 20 billion tons of high-
grade iron ore, significant diamond and gold deposits, and undetermined quantities of 
uranium (Global Investment Center, 2015: 34). Guinea also ranks among the lowest 
countries on the Human Development Index, at 175 out of 189 countries in 2017 (United 
Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2018: 2). Although Guinea is a very 
interesting case study, the country’s experience is not meant to be representative of the 
diversity of the African continent. 
 
During the Second Republic (1984–1995), which began with a bloodless coup after the 
death of Sékou Touré that placed General Lansana Conté in power, a period of structural 
adjustment and a significant downturn in the contribution of the rich mining sector to the 
country’s economy began. This was due, among other reasons, in large part to Guinea’s 
very unfavorable bauxite price negotiations (Campbell, 2013: 279-286). The World Bank 
responded by recommending a new and very liberalized mining code in 1995 that 





incentives and tax concessions in order to attract investment. As a result, each company 
established in Guinea had a specific legal and tax agreement set out in annexes “protected 
by business secrecy” (Campbell, 2013: 288), which, consequently, did not have to be 
approved by the Guinean National Assembly. As is now publicly recognized, notably by 
the former Minister of Mines, Kerfalla Yansané, each company had contracts drawn up in 
advance; these agreements rarely adhered to the Code and, indeed, worked very much to 
the companies’ advantage (Camara, 2014).  
 
This situation dominated when three new bauxite megaprojects were negotiated in 2004–
2005. One of these negotiations merits special attention. In October 2004, Guinea’s 
Minister of Mines and Geology signed an agreement with Global Alumina Corporation 
(the Global Agreement) providing for the construction of facilities to permit bauxite to be 
processed locally. This agreement6 was unanimously ratified by Guinea’s National 
Assembly and then adopted two months later by presidential decree (Global Alumina 
Corporation, 2005: 1). The amended agreement has been examined by James Otto 
(2005), who concluded that the fiscal terms of the initial agreement, before amendment, 
were so much in favor of the investor that it was doubtful whether future politicians 
would honor them. In the context of global best practices, he noted, the agreement clearly 
did not provide a “fair” share to government. Otto also underlined that, although the 2005 
amendments were an improvement, the lavishness of the terms obtained would be a 
dangerous precedent, since future investors would demand similar treatment. (Otto, 2005: 
9, cited in Campbell, 2009a: 105-106).   
 
In terms of the history of ministerial discretion over the sharing of tax revenues, James 
Otto notes that: 
Guinea currently allows the Minister of Mines and the Minister of Finance to specify 
which taxes and fees, or portions of them, go to the government, local groups and 
funds. A matter as important as tax revenue distribution is in almost all nations 
specified by law and not left to the discretion of politically appointed ministers. It is 
recommended that the law be amended to clearly identify which taxes are to be 





should be set aside for affected communities. (Otto, 2005: 59, cited in Campbell, 
2009a: 104-105) 
 
As argued in an in-depth case study of Guinea (Campbell, 2009a: 66-118), in parallel 
with these on-going non-transparent processes in the country’s rich mining sector, 
widespread popular discontent had been on the rise for many years. This was due in part 
to the enormous hardship inflicted on the population by the lack of employment 
opportunities and soaring prices for essential good (Keita, 2007). Two important labor 
union federations, the Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée and the Union 
Syndicale des Travailleurs de Guinée (USTG), as well as other groups such as student 
associations, spearheaded the mobilization. President Lansana Conté responded to the 
popular uprising with violent repression meted out by the police and the presidential 
guard. For the first time in the country’s history, a popular uprising threatened the regime 
and paralyzed the state’s operations. The regime therefore had no choice but to negotiate 
with the unions. The outcome was an agreement that included the nomination of a prime 
minister, Lansana Kouyaté, favored by the unions. Significantly, the negotiations led to 
the announcement in April 2007 that the mining contracts that the government had signed 
with foreign companies would be revisited.  
 
Many Guineans welcomed the introduction of the new Mining Code, which was adopted 
in 2011 (Government of Guinea, 2011). The new Code proposed several innovative 
measures aimed at ensuring that the rich mining sector would begin to contribute to 
resolving the enormous challenges facing the country. However, the fate of the Code 
depended on the redefinition of the structural relations linking powerful external actors 
(both individuals and mining interests) and internal decision-makers. As noted, these 
relations have, in the past, been strikingly lacking in transparency. Within two years, by 
2013, the 2011 Code was amended to bring it more in line with the positions defended by 
the mining sector. Although certain key aspects were withdrawn, as noted below, not all 
were. 
The initial changes introduced in the 2011 Code are illustrative of recent trends in many 





frameworks for mining had been based, and which still are (this fact is discussed later in 
the paper). In Guinea, these changes were embodied in the 1995 Code introduced under 
the auspices of the IFIs.  
3.1 Civil society mobilization in Guinea and the introduction of mining reforms 
The 2011 Mining Code resulted from a long process involving popular uprisings, such as 
those of 2007 led by unions and civil society organizations, that paralyzed the state’s 
operations and the economy. In Guinea, the unions (notably the USTG) acted as a 
spearhead in this area. The USTG had initially supported demands concerning the 
improvement of relations between communities and mining companies, but soon also 
became outspoken about the unfair contracts that had been signed by the companies. 
Indeed, it was the union movement even more so than the political opposition of the time 
of the Condé regime (1984-2008) that made this area a feature of national politics. The 
USTG, which represented workers at all mining sites except Fria,7 effectively brought the 
question of the revised mining contracts to the forefront of the political debate.  
 
The Guinean Federation of Unions (Inter Centrale CNTG (Confédération Nationale des 
Travailleurs de Guinée)-USTG) also played an important role in formulating demands in 
the wake of the 2007 uprising. The ensuing social upheaval successfully led to the 
creation of a new government based on a larger consensus and headed by a new prime 
minister. As revealed by the January 27, 2007, tripartite agreement, which put an end to 
the general strike and permitted a return to calm, it was specified that certain mining 
contracts that the government had signed with foreign companies were to be revisited.8 
These demands, which linked social and political issues to economic reforms, may be 
seen as a manifestation of the awareness among the population of the profound 
difficulties characterizing the governance of the country’s rich mining sector.  
 
The critically important role the unions were able to play at the end of the Condé 
presidency needs to be resituated within a particular context. On the one hand, the regime 
was severely weakened by a succession of corruption scandals and the prolonged ill 





organizations were taken up by the newly elected president; he recognized that they were 
shared by the vast majority of Guineans, who wanted to ensure that mining companies 
contributed to a more equitable distribution of the country’s wealth.  
 
The revised 2011 Code introduced key measures to encourage the development of the 
country’s resources in a way that would benefit the economy and its population, as well 
as strengthened provisions to improve the transparency and accountability of the sector. 
These provisions included articles that encouraged that preference be given to the use of 
local goods and services, that set out a minimal quota system for hiring practices to 
ensure the employment of Guineans, and that called for training programs for the benefit 
of local firms and Guinean personnel. As well, given the legacy of a mining sector that 
had been characterized by a tendency to privilege the export of unprocessed raw ore, a 
critically important inclusion in the Code was an article that called on investors to refine 
transform minerals locally and introduced incentives to encourage this. The Code also 
spelled out clear and detailed obligations with regard to social and environmental impact 
assessments. These included obliging companies to assume financial responsibility for 
the displacement and resettlement of affected populations. 
 
In view of the historic lack of transparency in the sector, the new Code also included 
reforms designed to make mining companies and government regulators accountable to 
the Guinean public by introducing mechanisms to ensure reporting, access and 
verification of information, adherence to measures of transparency, and remedial 
measures. For example, on the issue of disclosure, the commitment to publish all mining 
contracts was—and indeed remains—a critical precondition to ensure transparency. As 
the Revenue Watch Institute noted, it will allow the Guinean government and population 
to analyze the impacts of past contracts, and where necessary, review contracts that have 
not provided an equitable return to the country. Moreover:  
Contract transparency will also reinforce the incentives for the government to make 
itself accountable to the population and to sign agreements that comply with the law, 
generate strong returns and protect the rights of citizens. Finally, contract 





obligations of the state and the private sector are known to all, a larger and more 
focused set of eyes can monitor compliance and support effective administration. To 
put this provision into action, the government will need to create a dedicated Internet 
site linked to the Ministry of Mines and includes copies of all the agreements. 
(Revenue Watch Institute, 2011) 
Several other measures also merit attention. The procedures for the award, renewal, 
transfer, and cancellation of mining titles were clarified in the measures set out in 
Articles 19 to 157. These provisions reduce the risk of arbitrary procedures in the award 
of contracts, for example, as regulators had been using their authority over regulatory 
approvals to elicit bribes from the industry, a feature that had been so prevalent in the 
sector in the past.  
 
Companies are also required to sign a code of good conduct in which they publicly 
commit not to engage in corrupt practices or those that hinder accountability. 
Additionally, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) rules and processes are 
now mandatory for all firms (even non-signatories). EITI is a voluntary initiative meant 
to encourage the transparency and disclosure of revenues and requires signatory 
governments to supply information along the extractive industry value chain from the 
point of extraction concerning how revenue makes its way from industry to the 
governments of resource-rich countries.  
 
As the Revenue Watch Institute (2011) noted:  
The corruption monitoring plan that every company will be required to develop in 
collaboration with the government can help ensure follow-through on the 
commitment to prevent corruption. It will require companies to remain vigilant 
against corrupt acts by their staffs and agents, to report and take steps to mitigate any 
suspicious activities, to cooperate with the government in any investigations of 
suspected corruption, and to take proactive measures such as training personnel in 





that corruption has played a powerful and unfortunate role in the management of the 
sector and that Guinea seeks to change the culture of doing business in mining.  
The new Code introduced other far-reaching reforms that were met with opposition. 
Among the important measures that signaled an attempt to redefine relations in the sector 
were the provisions to increase public participation. Article 150 in Chapter IX stipulates 
that the state may acquire a 15% participation in shares of mining companies and the 
possibility of an additional 20%, depending on the ore. Participation in share capital can 
be seen as an important way to ensure oversight of the implementation of the codes of 
good conduct or the EITI principles to which companies agree to sign on. It is a 
potentially important condition to ensure that those who are responsible for the 
management of the sector will be held accountable to the Guinean population.  
3.2 Counter-reforms yet lasting innovative measures 
Little time had passed after the 2011 Code was enacted by the Guinean Parliament before 
strong pressures to amend it, notably from certain key mining companies and financial 
institutions, became apparent.9 Consequently, the new Code was amended in April 2013, 
and while some important aspects were modified (Reuters, 2013), other innovative 
clauses remained. For example, the changes introduced a decrease in mining-profit taxes 
to 30% from 35%, and a reduction in the tax on bauxite to 0.15% of the international 
market price for aluminium, from 0.55%. Other changes introduced in 2013 included an 
increase in the number of mining licenses a single company could hold to five from three, 
a boost to the land area covered by exploration permits, and a lower minimum investment 
required for certain types of concessions. However, the 2013 Code retained a 
controversial clause giving the state a free 15% stake in mining projects—as well as the 
option of purchasing an additional 20%—although it stipulated that contracts signed 
before 2011 would be exempt from this provision (Reuters, 2013). 
 
Other important forward-looking measures remained in the 2013 amended Code, 
including those dealing with local processing of mineral, the training of personnel, and 
the protection of the environment. These measures, while innovative, have already seen 





permitting the redefinition of relations among the actors concerned by the sector. The 
first example is a clause in Article 130, which sets out, and consequently regulates, the 
relations and contributions of mining title holders to local communities.10 The second 
innovative clause concerns the obligation to publish all title holdings and contracts. To 
this end, Article 217, Régimes applicable aux titres antérieurs, stipulates the following:  
All Mining Titles, as well as any Mining Agreement, are published in the Official 
Gazette and on the official website of the Ministry in charge of Mines, or any other 
site designated by the Minister. Any confidentiality clause in a Mining Agreement 
which prohibits the publication of a Mining Agreement is null and void. (Translation 
by the author). 
It is clear that these provisions represent important gains; however, these need to be set 
within a more dynamic and historical context. 
 
The profound problems of political will and institutional capacity faced by Guinea can be 
attributed at least in part to the neoliberal reform process of the 1980s and 1990s, which 
resulted in a strong retrenchment of the state from the mining sector, accompanied by 
parallel processes that redefined its role while reducing state sovereignty. These 
processes contributed to the state’s reduced autonomy and authority as well as to its 
reduced capacity to influence the evolution of its own structures (Campbell, 2010: 207). 
As has been the case in a number of other African countries where mineral resources are 
plentiful, the narrowing of the margin of manoeuvre of mineral-rich states such as Guinea 
and of their policy space in the context of an externally driven reform process has, in 
certain circumstances, been accompanied by the institutionalization of a particular mode 
of reproducing domestic power relations or a particular “politics of mining.” 
 
In a way that also clearly resonates in Mongolia, the reforms that brought about the 
neoliberal structuring of the mining sector in Guinea had several consequences that help 
explain the resilience of the mining regime that had been in place for two decades. The 
reforms diminished state power and capacity in Guinea by reducing both resources and 





which Guinean political elites and decision processes depend on links with powerful 
foreign actors (corporate, financial, and diplomatic). Finally, they reduced domestic 
power/resilience and created structural dependencies of elites on foreign actors.  
 
While strong civil society pressures (union protests, student demonstrations, public 
opinion) in favor of national economic reform did succeed in bringing in the new 2011 
mining code, these counter-forces were not in a position to effectively protect all aspects 
of the reforms. Clearly, the nature of the historical and political relations that provide the 
background for analyzing the links between the legacy of structural relations and the 
reform process remain largely in place and of key importance. However, the potential of 
recent reforms to contribute to the ongoing process of the reshaping of policy space in 
Guinea and the conditions that would permit this to happen also merit close attention.  
 
4. Reform and counter-reform in Mongolia (1997–2013) 
As with the liberalization process that took place on the African continent in the early 
1980s, albeit over a decade later, the IFIs, especially the World Bank, began to pressure 
mineral-rich countries in the Asian region to further liberalize their mining industry. As 
such, by the turn of the century, all major nonfuel mineral producers in the region had 
passed new regulations aimed at attracting a greater share of foreign investments (Naito 
et al., 1998: 92). As in the African continent, these neoliberal regimes have increasingly 
fed local tensions. Over the course of the following decade, this process of contestation, 
which emerged in multiple arenas and took a number of forms, led to important shifts in 
practice and, consequently, to the formation of new political spaces. While several Asian 
cases resonate with such trends,11 this paper focuses on the case of Mongolia. As outlined 
above in the analysis of Guinea, the situation in Mongolia is by no means representative 
of the complexity of the entire region. However, given its importance in terms of mineral 
reserves and production in the region, the case of Mongolia does allow for relevant 
observations vis-à-vis broader trends.  
 
Mongolia sits on 6,000 deposits comprising 80 different minerals, notably coal, copper, 





US$1.3 trillion. Although industrial mining has taken place across Mongolia throughout 
its 70-year socialist regime, Mongolia has only recently begun to position itself as one of 
the world’s key mineral producers. Mining contributed 13% to the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2002, but quickly became key to the country’s economy, 
accounting for 30% of its GDP in 2012 (Mendoza, et al., 2012). Indeed, the brisk 
expansion of the country’s mining sector made Mongolia the fastest-growing economy in 
the world in 2011 (Langfitt, 2012).13 In the Gobi Desert, the Tavan Tolgoi mine is 
projected to become the world’s largest coal mine, and Oyu Tolgoi (OT) is on track to 
become the third-largest copper and gold mine in the world. By 2016, the sector 
accounted for 18.6% of total government revenues and 86% of total exports in 
Mongolia (EITI Mongolia, 2018).  
 
In 1997, with IFIs’ guidance, Mongolia adopted one of Asia’s most attractive mining 
laws for foreign investors (Connors, 2011; USAID, 2011: 2). The World Bank’s 
influence over the country’s extractive industry has been —and remains—pivotal 
(Hatcher, 2014; McMahon, 2010; World Bank, 2008). The Bank itself noted that:  
The Bank has been supporting and nurturing the development of the regulatory 
framework for private sector led mining sector exploration and development for 
more than 10 years. During this time the focus of activities has been on establishing 
the legislative and fiscal regimes to apply to mining…. This work culminated in the 
passing of the 1997 Mineral Law and adoption of a reasonably competitive fiscal 
regime for the sector. (World Bank, 2008: 3) 
 
Although it successfully attracted foreign investors, the law also fed internal tensions 
arising from the mining sector’s severe socio-environmental outcomes, as well as the 
resultant increase in income inequalities in the country. Summarizing the processes of 
contestation in Mongolia is a monumental task, given the importance of the sector for the 
country’s economy and the scale and pace of the sector’s development. With this in mind, 
some of the more significant challenges to the most liberal norms embedded in the 1997 





4.1 Civil society mobilization in Mongolia and the introduction of mining reforms 
The 1997 Mining Code saw a significant transfer of land rights to mining corporations 
and away from local nomadic people.14 In Mongolia, agriculture accounts for a minimal 
portion of land use (approximately 1%); livestock grazing accounts for the overwhelming 
share (Lahiri-Dutt and Dondov, 2016: 5). Yet despite the importance of nomadism for the 
livelihood of herders, who represent approximately 30% of the population, the new 
regulatory framework expressly privileged large-scale mining over any other type of 
territorial use.15 The fast pace of mining expansion in the country, as well as the 
importance of the sector for Mongolia’s population of only three million people, have 
made it a pivotal issue for public debate. 
 
With the increasing environmental footprint of the mining sector, civil society 
mobilization in Mongolia first began around environmental issues. Spearheaded by the 
1997 liberal regime, the country witnessed an exponential multiplication of mining 
licenses and activities, a process that was not accompanied by tightened socio-
environmental monitoring capacities.  
 
The first sizeable wave of mobilization is best illustrated by the successes of the Ongi 
River Movements. The first of these began in 2001, when Lake Ulaan, at the mouth of 
the Ongi River—the only river flowing through the Gobi Desert—dried up following the 
fast-paced development of gold-mining activities in the region. Using a wide range of 
mobilization and protest techniques—such as sponsoring environmental studies, 
petitions, organizing a protest march along the Ongi River, and holding public meetings 
and rallies—the movement was highly successful in bringing the country’s attention to 
the environmental ramifications of unrestrained mining activities (Byambajav, 2015: 94; 
Fish and Seeberg, 2017: 137-8). It also led to the establishment of the Land of My 
Mongolia Coalition, which in turn, began to advocate for better environmental standards 
and responsible mining initiatives, and to promote multi-stakeholder dialogue. 
Namkhaijantsan (2009: 61) observes that: “This was the first time discussions of this sort 
were organized around the mining sector, and came about at the height of civil society 






One of the most emblematic results of this mobilization was the adoption in 2009 of the 
Law to Prohibit Mineral Exploration and Mining Operations at the Headwaters of Rivers, 
Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and Forested Areas, commonly known as the “Law 
with the Long Name” (LLN)16—legislation that was meant to protect nomadic herders’ 
lands and watersheds from industrial contamination, the diversion of rivers, and land 
grabbing by mining companies. The law has been credited with helping reduce pollution 
in water systems, particularly from mining activities. 
 
Transparency was another initiative that rallied civil society working on mining-related 
issues. This mobilization led to Mongolia’s adherence to EITI in early 2006. The 
initiative provided civil society with “the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with the 
government and companies over substantive issues in the mining sector” 
(Namkhaijantsan, 2009: 62).  
 
It is worth noting that, while mining has been a socio-environmental issue across the 
country, it is the OT project that has galvanized discussions around mining in recent 
years—with an initial investment of US$4.6 billion, the copper–gold mine was by far the 
largest project in the country’s history. OT’s investment agreement was signed in 
October 2009 following years of heated debates. In a study that looked at the contract 
negotiations for OT, Combellick-Bidney (2012) shows that a diverse range of actors in 
the society—whether businesses, NGOs, or grassroots anti-mining movements—were 
actively engaged in questioning the legitimacy of mining “as a means of economic 
development” (Combellick-Bidney, 2012: 272). This mobilization movement across the 
country, in conjunction with the high commodity prices, helped pressure the government 
to amend some of the most liberal provisions embedded in the 1997 Mining Code. The 
amendments, which took place in 2006, introduced special provisions for minerals 
labeled “of strategic importance,”17 increased fiscal rates, and adopted a windfall profits 
tax on gold and copper that was the highest in the world (Pistilli, 2012). The purpose of 





which case they would be exempt from the tax. Additional revenues from the tax were to 
be earmarked for social programs (USAID, 2011: 2).18 
 
Another significant change to the country’s regime came a month before the 2012 
parliamentary elections, when the government approved an investment law that limited 
foreign ownership to a maximum of 49% in “strategic” sectors such as mining, finance, 
media, and telecommunication.19 After the election, about a quarter of the seats in the 
new Parliament went to “resource nationalists,”20 who called for mining reform that 
would challenge some of the mining regime’s most liberal norms. In response, President 
Elbegdorj of the Democratic Party)21 who was elected for a second term in June 2013, 
adopted measures to curb the fast-expanding sector. In 2010, his administration had also 
been responsible for the suspension of new mining and exploration licenses—a decision 
later confirmed in Parliament in December 2012. 
 
It is further illustrative to note that soon after its re-election for a second term, in 2013, the 
government attempted to renegotiate OT’s investment agreement. While the dispute 
included a list of 22 points drawn up by the government and addressed to OT’s foreign 
investors,22 it focused overwhelmingly on taxes and the costs associated to the mine. OT’s 
initial investment agreement, which, notably, was developed with a World Bank technical 
assistance project (World Bank 2009), was quite generous to investors. For example, 
taxes were stabilized for a period of 30 years and, as such, no fiscal or regulatory changes 
can be imposed unless they are more favorable to the investors; government shares were 
locked at 34% and the company received a 10% investment tax credit on all capital 
expenditures and investments made throughout OT’s construction period.23 Amid the 
dispute, the mining company Rio Tinto24 accused the government of a possible breach of 
contract and, in a highly mediated show of force, proceeded to halt the second, 
underground construction phase of its mine, which contained approximately 80% of the 
mine’s total value. During the dispute, the company laid off 1,700 workers, a 
considerable number in light of the country’s small population. 





In Mongolia, as in Guinea, reforms were met with a series of counter-reforms. Perhaps 
more successfully than in the case of Guinea, the pro-mining lobby was very, though not 
completely, successful in countering the reforms.   
 
Over the decade of counter-reform efforts, local and international pro-mining interests 
were quick to see any attempt to step away from the most neoliberal provisions in the 
mining regime as a display of “resource nationalism,” “populism,” or “statism.”25 
Headlines from the international and business press at the time are illustrative: 
“Resource-rich Mongolia plays populist card in run-up to polls,” wrote Reuters (2012b); 
while Asia Miner warned about “Uncertain times for mining in Mongolia” (Miller, 2012). 
Referring to the 2006 amendments to the 1997 Mining Code, the World Bank observed 
that the reforms embodied a “pushback by the state on private sector led development,” a 
move perceived by the multilateral institution as leaving the country’s minerals sector in 
a state of uncertainty and a weak regulatory setting (2009: vi). More recently, in reference 
to the new Investment Law, which was adopted in 2012, Jim Dwyer, the executive 
director of the Business Council of Mongolia, observed that the initial version of the 
law’s bill triggered “an overwhelming coming together of the business community” 
(cited in Reuters, 2012a). Crucially, with the amendment of the Foreign Investment Law 
as well as the attempts to revisit OT’s investment agreement happening in the 
background, foreign investors have been putting up a show of force by shunning the 
country—from a peak of US$4.5 billion in 2012, foreign investments in Mongolia fell to 
about US$400 million in 2014 (Kohn, 2015), leaving the country in a severe economic 
crisis.  
 
In the wake of this crisis, and bowing to local and international pressure, the government 
quickly reversed several of the recent changes to the country’s regulatory regime. For 
example, during the negotiations for OT’s investment agreement, the government agreed 
to cancel the windfall profits tax, which had been introduced in 2006 (World Bank, 2009: 
15). As well, in October 2013, the government ratified a new version of the Investment 
Law, in order to reassure foreign investors, and, in 2015, it reached a settlement between 





It called for an emergency session of Parliament and, in a move designed to appease Rio 
Tinto (Reuters, 2013), fired the head of Erdenes MGL LLC, the government-owned 
mining company that controls the public stake in the OT mine. In December 2015, a 
US$5.3 billion deal was signed, launching construction of the second phase of the mine.26  
 
Finally, in 2015, Parliament attempted to pass damaging changes to the LLN, the 
country’s environmental law and the product of more than a decade of grassroots 
activism in Mongolia. While the proposed amendments were unsuccessful, it had become 
apparent by then that the enforcement of the LLN had always been quite weak. Mining in 
areas theoretically protected by the law had continued in secret, resulting in conflicts 
between miners and pastoralist communities, further pollution, and mass protests. The 
environmental activist Tsetsegee Munkhbayar27 and five of his colleagues received a 
prison sentence of 21 years and six months in the aftermath of one of these protests that 
were organized to deliver a petition to Parliament to stop the amendment of the LLN, 
during which a firearm accidently discharged.  
 
The multiplication of mobilization strategies and to some extent a radicalization of such 
strategies are illustrative of the larger issue of neoliberal norms embedded in the 
country’s mining regime. Enkhbat Toochog of the Southern Mongolian Human Rights 
Information Center notes that Munkhbayar’s actions “highlighted the desperation of 
helpless Mongolian pastoralists who had no choice but to resort to an unconventional 
approach to defend their land, rights and way of life after exhausting all other means” 
(cited in Tolson, 2014). 
 
The above-noted examples of counter-reforms in Mongolia are significant. However, as 
in Guinea, some innovative gains resisted counter-reform. For example, in the settlement 
that ended the dispute between Rio Tinto and the government, the company agreed to 
base its 5% sales royalty on gross revenue, cut its management fees in half, and give up a 
smelter royalty. However, one of the more persistent aspects of the reform process in 
Mongolia can be seen through the continued mobilization of civil society over mining-





and the increasing use of international grievance mechanisms have all taken place. 
Indeed, in May 2017, one of the cases filed against OT reached two agreements 
(Edwards, 2017). Although other cases in several other arenas were filed, the case filed 
with the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, the independent recourse mechanism for the 
International Financial Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 
led to two agreements that address some of the herders’ most pressing concerns, 
particularly water access, mitigating mining’s impact on pasturelands, and supporting and 
diversifying local economic activities (Accountability Counsel, 2017; Edwards, 2017).  
 
As noted, the rapid expansion of mining in Mongolia, the significance of the sector for 
the country’s population, and the tremendous economic benefits at stake help explain, on 
the one hand, the rapid rise and far-reaching political support of the contestation process 
and, on the other, the strength of efforts to suppress this process. 
 
5. Contrasting Experiences of Contestation 
As the case studies of Guinea and Mongolia demonstrate, as of the 2000s, among 
responses to the neoliberal reforms embedded in mining regimes, initiatives aimed at 
redefining the relations among actors emerged at various levels. In this section, we 
compare the contexts that gave rise to these initiatives. 
 
First, clear and important country-specific differences help explain why the contestation 
of neoliberal reforms led to quite different results in the two countries. In Guinea, for 
example, trade unions appeared to play a key role; this was much less the case in 
Mongolia. In that country, the geopolitical proximity to China, and the resulting fear of 
that superpower’s influence, fed (and continues to feed, as illustrated by the campaign 
platforms that led to the election of Khaltmaagiin Battulga in 2017) contestation over 
some of the neoliberal norms embedded in the mining regime, notably the focus on 
foreign investments.28 
 
The issue of timing is also a key point to underline in both countries. In Guinea, 





internal political changes that took place during the mining boom of 2002–2012. High 
commodity prices also played a key role in shaping Mongolia’s mining regime; OT was 
just beginning production as the international mining boom ended. Since that time, 
Mongolia has become so indebted that it does not have the ability to negotiate with its 
mining sector players. Indeed, in 2017, the International Monetary Fund stepped in to bail 
out Mongolia, which was drowning under a total external debt of US$26 billion, 
more than twice the country’s GDP (Kiezebrink, Ahlers, and Sukhgerel, 2018: 8). In 
return, Mongolia accepted a set of budgetary reforms that included a number of severe 
austerity measures.  
 
In addition, the situation in Guinea points toward a cumulative pattern in which formal 
statements by regional bodies have in fact been accompanied by important changes in 
national mining regimes. This suggests, at least in the case of certain African countries, 
that changes demanded at the continental and national levels have been spurred, in a 
growing number of cases, by the demands of local communities and workers affected by 
the mining sector. For example, at the continental level in the 2000s, many African 
political leaders became increasingly disillusioned as a result of the very disappointing 
contribution of the extractive sector to local development, as well as ongoing problems 
with heavy environmental and social impacts and the absence of measures to ensure more 
transparent and equitable negotiation of regimes and contacts. The opening phrase of the 
“Addis Ababa Declaration on Development and Management of Africa’s Mineral 
Resources,” adopted in 2008 by the First African Union Conference of Ministers 
Responsible for Mineral Resources Development, notes that the ministers are “deeply 
concerned about the high incidence of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa in—spite 
of its abundant endowment of mineral resources” (African Union [AU], 2008: 2). This 
statement makes clear that the tone had evolved significantly and was quite different 
from that used to characterize the sector just a decade before. The document goes on to 
explicitly address issues of policy space and the nature of relations among actors:  
Convinced that Africa needs policy space, and Recognizing in this regard, the 





investment regimes and to maximize the benefits derivable from mineral resources 
exploitation….(African Union [AU], 2008: 2).  
The ministers called on the African Development Bank to “strengthen the capacity of 
African member states to negotiate better mineral contracts” (AU, 2008: 4 ). The 
declaration led to the adoption of a key political statement by the heads of states and of 
governments of the African Union in 2009, the African Mining Vision (AU, 2009). In 
this context of demand for reform, documents produced at the regional level by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) argue that several important 
dimensions need to be addressed (UNECA and AU, 2011; AU, 2009). First, a 
“developmental perspective” needs to be adopted, one that involves development from 
the perspective of the countries concerned as opposed to one which presumes that 
development will necessarily flow from the presence of foreign investment in the 
extractive sector. Second, the adoption of a developmental perspective requires 
reinforcing rather than weakening the institutional and negotiating capacity of 
governments of mineral-rich countries, as well as beginning to correct information 
asymmetries. This translates into a series of specific recommendations that were 
assembled in a 12-chapter report, including building local linkages, the local processing 
transformation of minerals, boosting local employment, diversifying the minerals 
extracted, creating industrial corridors, improving small-scale mining, and building 
infrastructure from a developmental and regional perspective (UNECA and AU, 2011).29  
 
There is reason to believe that the role played by UNECA has given legitimacy to the call 
for revisiting neoliberal regulations. At the national level, and as illustrated by the case of 
Guinea, these concerns led to numerous cases of the renegotiation of mining contracts 
and codes. By 2008, in fact, 11 African countries (South Africa, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
and Zambia30) had decided to reopen contracts that tied them to mining companies. Since 
then, this movement has continued and even intensified. Over the same period, and again 
as illustrated by the Guinean case study, an extensive process of the revision of mining 
codes took place in, among other countries, Liberia, Zambia, and Tanzania, with a view 





concerned (Maury, 2008: 84-86; Custers, 2008: 12-13). More generally, the move for 
reform has spread throughout the continent, as many mineral-rich countries had, by 2018, 
systematically incorporated the African Mining Vision into their mining legislation 
(UNECA and AU, 2011). Guinea is a particularly interesting case in this regard, not only 
because it is illustrative of what is happening elsewhere on the continent but because it 
represents a story of ambitious reform enabled by popular uprisings in spite of a context 
of strong repression that has accompanied extreme potential mineral wealth, very high 
stakes, and external pressures. The counter-reforms of 2013 and the challenges that will 
have to be faced in the future to ensure the actual implementation of the innovative 
measures serve as a reminder of Guinea’s deeply rooted problems of regulatory capacity, 
which are part of the very common legacy of the neoliberal reform process. 
 
In contrast, in Asia, regional initiatives aiming at redefining relations among actors have 
not materialized. The failure to organize at the regional level may help to explain why the 
Asian region shows fewer signs of reform. For example, while the Asian Development 
Bank does recognize, in its Long-Term Strategic Framework 2008–2020, that the Bank’s 
future projects will be dedicated to inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth, it 
remains silent on an actual approach to the extractive industries (ADB, 2008). Similarly, 
and limited to the region of Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations31 
has historically been one of the key actors promoting neoliberal norms in the sector. 
Lastly, but crucially, China’s far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative is expected to feed 
into the mining potential of resource-rich countries across the region, including Central 
Asia, a process that does not appear to challenge in any form the neoliberal norms 
embedded in the region’s mining regimes.      
 
An additional point to emphasize is the fact that both case studies clearly demonstrate the 
importance of examining multiple dimensions of the processes of contestation that unfold 
in multiple arenas, notably arenas other than those responsible for institutional and 
regulatory changes. In addition to the clear example of the legitimacy provided by the 
leadership taken by the UNECA, calls for greater transparency from international bodies 





For example, pressures from civil society, including the strong support of the union 
movement as well some technical expertise from abroad (e.g., the Revenue Watch 
Institute), have resulted in Guinea being one of the first countries to oblige all companies 
operating within it to publish all contracts,32 as well as to have regulations that define in 
specific percentage terms and as a proportion of total sales revenue, depending on the 
mineral mined, the contribution a company will make to local communities. This type of 
regulated disclosure ensures the availability of information and consequently permits 
monitoring of the amounts actually distributed. It should be underlined that gains such as 
these with regard to information about revenue flows are part of a much broader pattern 
in the sub-region.33 The capacity of countries to monitor the enforcement of these new 
measures remains an issue that will need to be monitored closely in the future, however.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In our analysis of these two cases of mineral-rich countries, Guinea and Mongolia, we did 
not intend to suggest that a linear and self-sustaining process of contestation has 
redefined asymmetrical relations and opened up new political spaces. Rather, we have 
simply tried to understand the conditions that contribute to the possibility of change in the 
distribution of authority and influence. It was argued that these processes can be 
conceptualized and theorized by drawing on two notions introduced earlier in this paper: 
structural relations of power and modes of governance. The decision to deal with each of 
these concepts separately has allowed us to track a deeper dynamic in the struggles that 
are taking place in the contestations over extractive governance. In general, analysts and 
scholars focus on struggles over modes of governance—that is, the existing regulatory 
frameworks and institutional arrangements that govern mining. However, as argued in 
this paper, the truly important struggle going on in these conflicts is about structural 
power: the ability to shape the rules over the long term.  
The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s and 2000s changed the modes of governance in ways 
that not only favored the economic interests of transnational mining firms, but also 
allowed mining enterprises to reproduce and protect their structural power vis-à-vis states 
such as Guinea and Mongolia. In turn, this helps to explain why civil society mobilization 





achieved fell short of shifts that significantly affect structural power relations. In other 
words, such mobilizations have not been able to bring about the kinds of reforms that 
would allow civil society actors to use the modes of governance as leverage to increase 
their structural power. As a result, extractive firms were able to use their structural power 
(which largely remained intact) to reverse the modes of governance in a process of 
counter-reform.  
 
While our analysis of multiple forms of contestation in Guinea and Mongolia does not 
lead us to suggest that these represent fundamental changes of regime, it does point 
toward the emergence of a continuum of interconnected arenas of contestation that have 
entailed, in some instances, shifts in the relations of power and influence among actors. 
In Mongolia, the introduction of special provisions for minerals labeled “of strategic 
importance,” which increased fiscal rates imposed on the sector, the adoption of the 
windfall profits tax, as well as tighter environmental legislations, are all examples of 
initiatives to redefine the neoliberal norms favoring state withdrawal and the unimpeded 
activities of private operators embodied in the reformed regulatory frameworks of the 
1990s. While in Mongolia, most of these counter-reforms were challenged and later 
reversed, in Guinea, some of the initial changes introduced as new requirements in the 
2011 Guinean Mining Code were maintained in the 2013 amendments to the Code, 
particularly in regard to the legislated requirements of local transformation and state 
participation.34 In short, the fact that civil society reforms have not been completely 
reversed suggests that a slight shift in structural power relations has indeed taken place. 
Presumably, it is too politically dangerous for the stability of the current regime in either 
Mongolia or Guinea to completely undo the reforms promised to civil society actors, 
begging the question of whether these slight shifts are simply the price of legitimacy or if 
they signal a potential for more important changes in the future. 
 
To the extent that the notion of structural relations of power refers to the capability to 
create essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of a 
particular system, whether national or international, we conclude that at the time these 





power within the existing regime, which continued to remain dominant. The case studies 
examined in this paper point to the importance of examining the multiple dimensions of 
these processes that unfold in different arenas, and notably arenas other than those 
responsible for institutional and regulatory changes, but which are intimately 
interconnected with such regulatory changes. In short, any analysis of conflicts over 
extractive governance needs to consider how struggles over modes of governance 
influence the greater game of struggles over structural power. 
 
The trends we have documented underline the usefulness of the suggestion that: 
“Ascertaining how reform efforts are being pursued in different parts of the world 
provides an opportunity to think critically about what is central to extractivism, and to 
identify the significant differences between these national or regional projects” 
(Szablowski and Zalik, 2014: 2-3). Research that pays close attention to the 
methodological approaches adopted and their capacity to identify and analyze such 
shifting power relations will, in the future, help better characterize the kinds of new 
directions being taken. Such approaches are all the more important given that deep 
neoliberal reforms are self-reproducing, changing structural relations of power in today’s 
neoliberal global political economy. In short, these kinds of methodological approaches 
suggest that when reforms have indeed begun to take place, civil society actors need to 
press for changes in the modes of governance that can affect the distribution of structural 
power, as less substantial changes are vulnerable to being reversed. 
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1 These norms are also characteristic of the “free mining” regimes that exist in Canada today. See Campbell 
(2010). 
2 While such impacts are increasingly documented, it is worth noting that some of the environmental 
challenges linked to large-scale mining activities include the destruction of natural habitats, soil degradation 
and chemical contamination, toxic air emissions, and water pollution–related issues. The mining industry’s 
environmental impacts extend well beyond the duration of its mines’ activities and as such, mine closure is a 
highly sensitive issue. In addition, communities living within the vicinity of a mine often bear an 
overwhelming share of the negative impacts linked to large-scale mining activities. As well, mining activities 
continue to be associated with serious cases of human rights abuses (see Belem, 2009b; Kemp and Owen, 
2017; Sawyer and Gomez, 2012; FIAN 2017; Yameogo and Kabore, 2014). Also see the Human Rights 
Watch reports on oil, mining, and natural resources at www.hrw.org/topic/business/oil-mining-and-natural-
resources.  
3 Among criticisms one can note and as summarized by Tooze is her unwillingness to give primacy to the 
knowledge structure, her not escaping as completely as she might have the “state centrism” of the orthodoxy, 
and her falling short of constructing a truly integrated study of political economy. See Tooze, 2000: 287–288.  
4 See Campbell (2010) and Campbell and Laforce (2010).  
5 The Guinean case study is based on a synthesis of more than 30 years of research using the filière approach 
to understanding the key bauxite-alumina sector, informed by insights gained from international heterodox 
political economy, and complemented by a focus on the processes of regulatory reform over the last 20 years. 
The study on Mongolia relies on desk studies, field research, and interviews undertaken between 2013 and 
2017. 
6 As modified by an amendment negotiated in May 2005. 
7 The Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée (CNTG) was more active in Fria. 
8 Signed on January 27, 2007, the agreement between the Inter Centrale CNTG-Union Syndicale des 
Travailleurs de Guinée (USTG), the Conseil National du Patronat Guinéen, and the Guinean Government of 
Général Lansana Conté, which put an end to the general strike, included, among other clauses, the creation of 
a government based on a large consensus headed by the new prime minister; respect for the principle 
enshrined in the constitution of the separation of powers; support for the purchasing power of the population 
and a reduction in gas prices; an end to the export of food, fish, and forest products; a reduction in the price of 
50-kg bags of rice; the revision of certain contracts of the mining, fishing, and forest industries; repatriation of 
foreign currency of companies including mining companies; increased social protection for workers; and 
increased employment and job opportunities for youth. The Organisation Nationale des Syndicats Libres de 
Guinée and the Union Démocratique des Travailleurs de Guinée joined the CNTG/USTG in demanding that 
past mining contracts be revisited until the new Mining Code was introduced in 2011.  
9 In a press release published in the fall of 2011, the government noted that there had been discussions with 
certain mining companies and financial institutions concerning royalty rates, customs or import duties, 
taxes, and other fiscal charges. In order to make the country’s mineral resources as competitive as possible 
compared with those of other countries, it announced that changes were to be brought in by decree to the 
new (2011) Code’s fiscal measures.   
10 English translation of the 2011 Mining Code’s Article 130: Development of the Local Community:  
The holder of a Mining Operation Title must enter into a Local Development Agreement (LDA) with the 






                                                                                                                                                                                     
drafting these agreements are set out in a joint order of the Minister in charge of Mines and the Minister 
in charge of Decentralization. 
The purpose of the Local Development Agreement is to establish conditions that are conducive to the 
efficient and transparent management of the Contribution to Local Development paid by the holder of the 
Mining Operation Permit, and to strengthen the capacities of the Local Community in the planning and 
implementation of the community development program. 
The Local Development Agreement must include, among other things, provisions for training the Local 
Community and, more generally, Guineans, environmental protection and health measures for the Local 
Community, and processes for the development of social projects. Principles of transparency and 
consultation will be applied to the management of the Local Economic Development Fund and to any 
Local Development Agreement, which will be published and made available to the Local Community. 
The amount of the Contribution to Local Development, the financial contribution of the holder of a 
Mining Operation Title to the development of the Local Community, is fixed at zero point five percent 
(0.5%) of the turnover of the company made on a Mining Title of a zone for category 1 mine substances 
and one percent (1%) for other mine substances. 
A Local Development Fund (LDF) is created which will be financed by this Contribution to Local 
Development from the holder of the Mining Title from the Date of First Commercial Production. The 
terms for using this Contribution to Local Development and the rules for the operation and management 
of the Local Development Fund are set out by decree of the President of the Republic. 
11 Several country case studies examine the liberalization process of mining sectors across the region, 
although most of these use a neoliberal framework. Several critical international political economy are also 
available, however. For example, in the Philippines, one of Asia’s richest countries in terms of its natural 
resources, see Bello et al. (2004), Hatcher (2012; 2014), Nettleton et al. (2004) and Rovillos et al. (2003). 
Another example is Laos (Hatcher, 2015). 
12 In addition to these minerals, Mongolia is believed to have reserves of asbestos, bismuth, clay, copper, 
diamonds, gemstones, graphite, gypsum, lead, limestone, magnesium, molybdenum, nickel, petroleum, 
phosphate, platinum-group metals, rare earths, salt, sand and gravel, silica, talc, tin, tungsten, uranium, zeolite, 
and zinc (USGS, 1999: 15.1). 
13 Although it was expected to further accelerate to a staggering 20% in 2012 (Pilling, 2012), it fell 
significantly short of expectations and dropped to 12%. This was linked to falling commodity prices and an 
economic slowdown in China (Economist, 2013: 29). 
14 For a thorough analysis, see Hatcher (2014) and Lander (2017).  
15 For a discussion over the politics of small-scale mining in the country, see Hatcher (2016a).  
16 The lawsuit was filed in 2010 and, in October 2011, the country’s Supreme Court found the government 
guilty and ordered it to enforce its environmental laws. 
17 “Strategic importance” is defined as: “a deposit [with size] that may have a potential impact on national 
security, economic and social development of the country at the national and regional levels or that is 
producing or has a potential of producing more than five (5) per cent of total Gross Domestic Product in a 
given year” (Article 4.1.11).  
18 In 2008, Mongolia also equipped itself with a Human Development Fund (HDF) fed by mining revenues. 
Authorized by Parliament in 2008, the HDF’s objective was to distribute wealth generated by the country’s 
mining projects to all Mongolians. In 2010, 16% of Mongolia’s budget was allocated to the HDF (UN, 2012), 






                                                                                                                                                                                     
19 Unless granted prior government approval. The law was approved on May 17, 2012. 
20 The coalition, at times portrayed as nationalistic, was formed when the Democratic Party retained only 31 
of the legislature’s 76 seats. 
21 President Elbegdorj was first elected in May 2009. 
22 Amongst the president’s concerns were issues relating to OT’s management costs, particularly the fact that 
6% of the investment would be used to pay the salaries of OT’s managers. Additionally, the president wanted 
all financial transactions of the project to be processed through Mongolian banks, and for OT to further 
address issues relating to the environmental aftermath of the mine, the transportation of its minerals, and the 
project’s power supply, which is currently fed via a temporary contract with China. The president also wanted 
a power station to be built in Mongolia, in addition to the promised copper factory. See Khash-Erdene (2013). 
23 Although there is an optional provision for an additional 16% government purchase of OT at the end of the 
initial 30-year term of the agreement. 
24 Rio Tinto is the largest shareholder in Turquoise Hill Resources, which owns 66% of OT’s shares; the 
Government of Mongolia owns the remaining 34%.  
25 The frosty reception from the pro-mining lobbies was mostly a result of the law’s provisions relating to state 
ownership. In a controversial move, the new version of the law stipulates that in cases of exploitation of 
minerals labeled of strategic importance, the state may now claim up to 34% when non-state funding sources 
are used to determine proven reserves (Article 5.5). The law further instructs holders of a mining license for a 
mineral deposit of strategic importance to trade no less than 10% of its shares on the Mongolian Stock 
Exchange (Article 5.6).  
26 The World Bank Group announced that it would inject a total of US$2.2 billion in debt and guarantees for 
the development of the second phase of the mine, the underground stage. Alongside several international 
private banks, the International Financial Corporation (IFC) is now providing a total loan facility of US$1,221 
million to the project, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency is providing up to US$1 billion in 
loan guarantees. See IFC (2015). 
27 Munkhbayar is the founder of the environmental organization United Movement of Mongolian Rivers and 
Lakes. He was awarded the prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize in 2007 for his environmental activism. 
28 On the so-called rise of resource nationalism in Mongolia, see Hatcher (2016b); on China specifically, see 
Jackson and Dear (2016).  
29 See AU (2009). Such strategies resonate with the recommendations of the Africa Mining Vision, which 
called for a “transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based 
sustainable growth and socio-economic development.” The proposals are summarized in Minerals and 
Africa’s Development: A Report of the International Study Group on Africa’s Mineral Regimes (UNECA and 
AU, 2011). 
30 The role of civil society organizations in bringing about the reopening of mining contracts in Africa can be 
documented in each case and is illustrated here using the case of Zambia. (Dymond,2007):  
Vedanta undermining development in Zambia - Zambian workers are getting an unfair deal: ACTSA in 
partnership with SCIAF and Christian Aid, with the support of Zambian civil society, have just published 
a major report—Undermining Development?—on why Zambia fails to derive the benefits that it should 
from its enormous copper reserves. The focus of the report is KCM, Zambia’s biggest copper company—
majority-owned by a UK-based company, Vedanta Resources. We have found disturbing evidence of 






                                                                                                                                                                                     
multinationals to bypass local laws and workers who receive little reward for grueling hours of physical 
labor. The Zambian Government is renegotiating contracts with the major mining companies. 
31 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
32 Under Article 217 of the 2013 Mining Code, Régimes applicable aux titre antérieurs, both current and past 
contracts are to be published in the Journal Officiel and posted on the official website of the Ministère en 
charges des mines. 
33 In Ghana, for example, the growing recognition of the need to ensure citizen oversight is illustrated in the 
petroleum sector by the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), created under section 51 of the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) (Ghana, 2011). For the case of Mali, see Keita (2016).  
34 As noted, the 2013 Code retains a controversial clause giving the state a free 15% stake in mining 
projects—as well as the option of purchasing an additional 20%—but makes clear that contracts signed before 
2011 will be exempt. Other forward-looking measures that remain in the 2013 Code include those concerning 
local processing of mineral, the publication of all mining contracts, the training of personnel, and protection of 
the environment. 
